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EQUITY, “REVENGE PORN,” & CAMBRIDGE ANALYTICA:  
THE DOCTRINE OF CONFIDENCE AS A PROTECTION FOR HUMAN 
DIGNITY IN THE TECHNOLOGIAL AGE
RAÚL MADDEN*
Breach of confidence is an equitable action that is increasingly significant 
for the protection of human dignity in the technological age. Its scope 
extends beyond the economic interests which more frequently invoke 
equity, to protecting dignity where an individual’s privacy interests have 
been violated. This paper considers the history of case development that 
consolidated the ability of confidence to protect dignity in its own right. It 
then looks at two contemporary contexts where new technologies 
necessitate the application of confidence to dignitary concerns: 
specifically, “revenge porn” cases where an individual abuses an intimate 
partner’s trust and privacy and in “data breach” situations where much 
larger entities release information of a data subject improperly. It is finally 
theorised that equity’s basis in conscience makes confidence well suited to 
protecting interests that are dignitary, rather than economic, in character. 
The contribution of this paper to the existing field of literature is to 
establish the growing utility of the doctrine of confidence as a private law 
action to deter and redress misuses of private information that are 
facilitated and amplified by technological advances. 
* Raúl Madden is a PhD student and Graduate Teaching Assistant at the University of Kent (Canterbury,
UK). He is also an admitted lawyer in the Supreme Court of Queensland.
Raúl Madden would like to acknowledge and thank the work of Nick Piška, for his helpful feedback on 
earlier versions of this paper.  
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I INTRODUCTION 
As technology develops, so do opportunities to inflict emotional injury and degradation 
on another person in ways more drastic and further reaching than previously imagined. 
The type of interest concerned in these cases is often an individual’s privacy, which is 
usually categorised as having its basis in human dignity.1 The equitable doctrine of breach 
of confidence, particularly in Australia, is one private law cause of action that has been 
invoked successfully to redress dignitary abuses. This paper is about the ability of the 
confidence doctrine to adapt, along with technological evolution, to protect human 
dignity. It begins by outlining the relationship between personal information, dignity, and 
confidence (Part II). Next, it traces a history of the application of confidence in relation to 
privacy, establishing a significant personal and dignitary space within its scope of 
protection beyond its commonly recognised capacity to protect commercial and 
proprietary interests (Part III). Following that, our discussion looks at how confidence 
has developed a deeply necessary private law response to “revenge porn” cases as well 
1 Australian Broadcasting Commission v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, 227 (Gleeson CJ) 
(‘Lenah’); Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, 50–51; Luciano Floridi, ‘On Human Dignity as a 
Foundation for the Right to Privacy’ (2016) 29 Philosophy and Technology 307, 308. 
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as instances of how new technologies can facilitate egregious emotional abuse in 
relationships between individuals (Part IV). Beyond protecting dignity in interpersonal 
relationships, confidence might provide solutions in “data” contexts where business or 
government entities misuse personal information with which they have been entrusted 
(Part V). Finally, it is theorised that equity’s foundation in conscience might explain why 
confidence has, and may further, protect dignity (Part VI). The contribution of this paper 
is to establish the usefulness of breach of confidence as a private law action, to address 
increasing opportunities presented by technological advancements for individuals and 
larger entities to misuse information in a manner which abuses the dignity of the subject. 
II DIGNITY, PERSONAL INFORMATION, & CONFIDENCE
In the broad context of personal information and data, dignity is considered a 
foundational interest forming the basis of privacy protections. As distinct from economic 
or proprietary interests, dignitary interests are predicated on the inherent value of a 
human being. Immanuel Kant theorised that ‘what has a price can be replaced by 
something else as its equivalent; what on the other hand is raised above all price and 
therefore admits of no equivalent has a dignity’.2 Kant distinguishes: 
[W]hat is related to general human inclinations and needs [which] has a market price
[and] that which constitutes the condition under which alone something can be an end in 
itself [which] has not mere relative worth, that is, a price, but an inner worth, that is 
dignity.3  
For Kant, autonomy — being what gives us the capacity for morality — confers upon us 
an ‘unconditional, incomparable worth’.4 Luciano comments that ‘the protection of 
privacy should be based directly on the protection of human dignity, not indirectly 
through other rights such as that to property or to freedom of expression’.5 Though there 
is no shortage of theories attempting to explain the content of human dignity,6 it is 
satisfactory for now, to proceed on the basis that the interests of human dignity constitute 
2 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, tr Mary J Gregor (Cambridge University 
Press, 2006) [trans of: Grundlegung zur Metaphysik of Morals (1785)] 42.  
3 Ibid.  
4 Ibid 43. 
5 Floridi (n 1) 308. 
6 See Ariel Zylberman, ‘Human Dignity’ (2016) 11 Philosophy Compass 201. 
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a primary value from which personal privacy derives, as differentiated from economic or 
proprietary interests.7  
Warren and Brandeis, in the classic 1890 American privacy article, advocated that tort 
law should protect privacy interests on the basis of ‘inviolate personality’,8 which 
Bloustein in 1964 conceived as positing ‘the individual’s independence, dignity and 
integrity … [defining] man’s essence as a unique and self-determining human being’.9 
They reasoned that this principle — distinct from that of private property — already 
protected personal writings and productions not just against theft and physical 
appropriation, ‘but against publication in any form’, and its logical extension is ‘to protect 
the privacy of the individual from invasion either by the too enterprising press, the 
photographer, or the possessor of any other modern device for recording or reproducing 
scenes or sounds’.10 As these advances in technology ‘rendered it possible to take pictures 
surreptitiously’, they theorised that ‘doctrines of contract and of trust are inadequate to 
support the required protection, and the law of tort must be resorted to’.11 While 
American case law has subsequently produced four separate privacy torts,12 in Australia, 
the development of confidence has afforded the predominant private law privacy 
protection.  
The elements of confidence are usually: that the information is confidential; that it was 
originally imparted in circumstances that attach an obligation of confidence; that there 
has been, or threatened, an unauthorised use of the information to the detriment of the 
party communicating it.13 However, that information was obtained by means (such as 
theft) other than it being confidentially imparted by the subject is not fatal to a confidence 
action, as it is ‘unconscionability’ that forms the basis for finding a breach of confidence.14 
According to Gleeson CJ in the High Court case of Lenah, ‘[t]he real task is to decide what 
7 It is not inconceivable that in some factual circumstances, however, both interests could intersect or be 
difficult to separate: see Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, 51, 53, 57 (Lord Hoffmann).  
8 Samuel D Warren and Louis D Brandeis, ‘The Right to Privacy’ (1980) 4 Harvard Law Review 193, 205. 
9 Edward J Bloustein, ‘Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser’ (1964) 39 New 
York University Law Review 962, 971 (emphasis added). 
10 Warren and Brandeis (n 8) 205. 
11 Ibid 211. 
12 Lake v Wal-Mart Stores Inc, 582 NW 2d 231, 235 (Minn, 1998). 
13 Lenah (n 1) 222 (Gleeson CJ), quoting Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41, 47 (Megarry J). 
14 Franklin v Giddins [1978] Qd R 72, 80; Lord Ashburton v Pape [1913] 2 Ch 469; See also Megan 
Richardson, ‘Breach of Confidence, Surreptitiously or Accidentally Obtained Information and Privacy: 
Theory Versus Law’ (1994) 19 Melbourne University Law Review 673. 
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a properly formed and instructed conscience has to say about publication’.15 Some types 
of personal information — such as that ‘relating to health, personal relationships or 
finances’ and ‘certain kinds of activity, which a reasonable person, applying 
contemporary standards of morals and behaviour, would understand to be meant to be 
unobserved’ — are identifiable as private.16 In many instances, ‘that disclosure or 
observation of information or conduct would be highly offensive to a reasonable person 
or ordinary sensibilities’ is a ‘useful practical test of what is private’.17 
In Australia, it has been acknowledged that ‘the foundation of much of what is protected, 
where rights of privacy, as distinct from rights of property, are acknowledged, is human 
dignity’.18 As Australia’s appellate courts have not established (nor conclusively rejected) 
a privacy tort, Gleeson CJ stated that ‘the law would protect what might reasonably be 
called a right of privacy, although the name accorded to the cause of action would be 
breach of confidence’.19 Not only is breach of confidence relevant to how an individual 
might use digital technology to abuse the trust or privacy of another individual, but also 
to how larger — private and public — entities might do the same. The European 
Parliament has acknowledged the link between data and dignity by approving the General 
Data Protection Regulation, which requires that measures be taken ‘to safeguard the data 
subject’s human dignity’.20  
Stephen Kennedy writes that ‘[t]he protection of human dignity cannot be divorced from 
the protection of human data’.21 He identifies three social threats to the protection of 
personal data: objectification, commodification, and politicisation. These categories help 
us to conceive why confidence is a pivotal private law action in relation to misuses of 
personal information by larger entities — potentially private and public — that are 
driven by the interests of profit or politics. This article now discuss how confidence came 
to be of utility in privacy litigation, before looking at the specific ‘revenge porn’ and data 
15 Lenah (n 1) 227 (Gleeson CJ) (emphasis added). 
16 Ibid 226 (Gleeson CJ). 
17 Ibid.  
18 Ibid (emphasis added).  
19 Ibid 224, citing Hellawell v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [1995] 1 WLR 804, 807 (Laws J). 
20 Position (EU) No 6/2016 of the Council at First Reading with a View to the Adoption of a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Natural Persons with regard to the Processing 
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data 
Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ C 159/1. 
21 Stephen Kennedy, ‘Data and Dignity — Protecting the Truth of Real Things’ (2017) 7 Journal of 
Christian Legal Thought 20, 20. 
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breach contexts of how confidence might apply to when individuals and larger entities 
can use new technologies to assail dignitary interests. 
III A HISTORY OF CONFIDENCE AS A PROTECTION OF PERSONAL INFORMATION 
‘Three things are to be helpt [sic] in Conscience, 
Fraud, Accident and things of Confidence’.22 
Confidence is an old, but not antiquated, doctrine with relevance beyond the commercial. 
From Sir Thomas More’s explanatory couplet, it appears that in the sixteenth century a 
few things were known about ‘confidence’: its basis was in equity’s underpinning concept 
of conscience, and it was of core significance to Chancery as one of three conceived 
categories of equitable actions. ‘Things of confidence’, as More used the term, refers — 
more broadly than the doctrine of confidence itself — to the jurisdiction of equity to 
intervene when a party had placed their trust in another and this trust was betrayed.23 
Our present discussion focuses on the narrower notion of confidence, the specific cause 
of action, having its basis in ‘an obligation of conscience arising from the circumstances 
in or through which the information was obtained’.24 
Private and personal information was the subject matter of many of the early reported 
English confidence cases. These cases illustrate how equity developed to protect privacy 
in technologically simpler times. In a series of early cases, confidence was invoked to 
protect privacy, although it tended to restrain publication on contractual or proprietary 
bases.25 Even where it was claimed that publication of private letters ‘was intended to 
22 Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41, 46 (Megarry J), quoting Sir Thomas More (Lord 
Chancellor). Notably, ‘confidence’ here referred to a broader principle of ‘trust’ ‘extending to all cases 
where one party placed reliance on another’s good faith’: see, eg, Mike Macnair, ‘Equity and Conscience’ 
(2007) 27 Oxford Journal of Cultural Studies 659, 677. 
23 Macnair (n 22) 677: ‘Confidence’, as an equitable jurisdiction, as referred to in More’s couplet, ‘is a 
synonym for trust, but this was wider than technical trusts, extending beyond fiduciary relations in the 
narrow sense (agency and partnership) to all cases where a party placed reliance on another’s good 
faith … As the equity jurisdictions expanded and developed … they never completely lost their conceptual 
links to this core’.  
24 Moorgate Tobacco v Philip Morris Ltd (No 2) (1984) 156 CLR 414, 438 (Deane J). 
25 Prince Albert v Strange (1849) 41 ER 1171, 1178: The employee of a printing business, engaged by the 
royal family to make copies of private family sketches, made unauthorised copies and sold them to a third 
party who wished to hold a showing of the sketches and publish a catalogue describing them. It was held 
that ‘the object and effect is to make known to the public more or less of the unpublished work and 
composition of the author, which he is entitled to keep wholly for his own private use and pleasure, and to 
withhold altogether, or so far as he may please, from the knowledge of others’ (emphasis added); Pollard v 
Photographic Company (1888) 40 Ch D 345, 350: ‘the bargain between the customer and the 
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wound [the plaintiff’s] feelings, and could have no other effect’,26 it was held that the 
sender retained ‘sufficient property in the original letters to authorise an injunction 
unless she has by some act deprived herself of it’.27 
In Argyll v Argyll, which concerned secrets orally confided in a marital relationship, 
restraint was imposed even in the absence of contractual or proprietary elements.28 A 
1966 article observed that in most of the earlier cases, it was accepted that breach of 
confidence could merit restraint of publication in its own right.29 Where there was a 
proprietary or contractual right at law, there was really no need to have equity act in the 
situation,30 aside from providing an injunctive relief which is especially useful in matters 
when a non-fungible interest such as privacy is at stake. Indeed, in later trade secret cases 
too, where there was no contract, confidence alone was deemed sufficient.31 Dickie 
concludes that while trade secrets have financial value and [false] attacks on reputation 
can be protected by tort, ‘it is clearly the sentiments or sensitivity of the plaintiff that 
alone are being protected’ in some early confidence cases.32 Reflecting on Argyll, he noted 
that if the court were to allow a: 
successful petitioner in a divorce action to breach confidences of trust that occurred 
during the marriage, it would not only provide the petitioner with double relief — divorce 
and divulgence — but would also cause many presently happily married couples to speak 
with a far more guarded tongue, foreseeing the dismal day when bliss has fled and such 
disclosures are the cause of a union’s dissolution.33  
Confidence, clearly, has a capacity to protect dignity in interpersonal, or intimate, 
relationships, which are the subject of Part IV. Equity’s conscience endeavours to ‘enforce 
a communal moral standard’ and developed in response to injustices that the common 
photographer includes, by implication, an agreement that the prints taken from the negative are to be 
appropriated to the use of the customer only’. 
26 Gee v Pritchard (1818) 36 ER 670, 671 (Lord Eldon). 
27 Ibid 678 (Lord Eldon). 
28 Duchess of Argyll v Duke of Argyll [1967] 1 Ch 302. 
29 Hans J Dickie, ‘Restraint of Breach of Confidence: Duchess of Argyll v Duke of Argyll’ (1966) 24 Faculty 
of Law Review 115, 120, citing Prince Albert v Strange (1849) 41 ER 1171, 1178. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Saltman Engineering v Campbell Engineering (1947) 65 RPC 203. 
32 Hans J Dickie, ‘Restraint of Breach of Confidence: Duchess of Argyll v Duke of Argyll’ (1966) 24 Faculty 
of Law Review 115, 122. 
33 Ibid. 
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law was unequipped to rectify.34 As privacy interests became the subject of increasing 
concern in society and of litigation, unsurprisingly the ability of confidence to protect 
privacy interests was discovered. It eventually became clear that these interests need not 
be articulated as something with profit-generating potential.35 
A series of mostly 1980s English and Australian cases illustrate the versatility of 
confidence in protecting privacy interests. Significantly, in England in 1988, it was 
affirmed that confidence applies to information about non-marital intimate 
relationships.36 In the same year, an injunction was granted to prevent defendants from 
publishing that two doctors had contracted AIDS.37 In Australia, confidence protected the 
identity of an informant.38 It also restrained publication of secret Aboriginal cultural 
knowledge.39 These cases concern sexual, health-related, safety, and cultural subject 
matters, the privacy of which courts deemed suitable for protection via confidence. 
Collectively, they suggest a continuation of Argyll’s trajectory of elucidating the utility of 
confidence as a dignitary protection. Also significant for confidence in relation to dignity 
is the finding that a duty of confidence may arise independently of ‘a transaction or a 
relationship between the parties’, when in the circumstances there is sufficient ‘notice’ 
that it would be just to preclude publication.40 This solidifies the understanding of 
confidence as an action that goes beyond the contractual and into the personal aspects of 
life.  
There are a couple of English cases from the 2000s about celebrities and the media where 
not a lot of the damage claimed could be described as dignitary.41 Douglas v Hello! 
concerned a celebrity wedding where the couple, who planned to sell exclusive 
photographs to one media outlet, successfully complained that photographs were 
34 Richard Hedlund, ‘The Theological Foundations of Equity’s Conscience’ (2015) 4 Oxford Journal of Law 
and Religion 119, 123, 139. 
35 Jennifer Stuckey, ‘The Equitable Action for Breach of Confidence: Is Information Ever Property?’ (2003) 
26 Sydney Law Review 402, 404 and 406: ‘the analysis that confidential information is a species of 
intangible property is juristically misguided and unhelpful’. This is ‘revealed in the situation where the 
confidential information disclosed or misused is of a personal nature for such information may have no 
appreciable commercial value’. 
36 Stephens v Avery [1988] Ch 449. 
37 X v Y [1988] 2 All ER 648. 
38 G v Day [1982] 1 NSWLR 24. 
39 Foster v Mountford and Rigby Ltd (1976) 29 FLR 233. 
40 Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109, 281. 
41 See, eg, I D F Callinan, ‘Privacy, Confidence, Celebrity and Spectacle’ (2007) 7 Oxford University 
Commonwealth Law Journal 1. 
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surreptitiously taken by another.42 Campbell v MGN, despite concerning a celebrity, 
shows that a person’s privacy can be protected in response to media publication of their 
drug addiction and rehabilitation efforts.43 The “public interest” defence did not defeat 
the confidence claim despite the plaintiff’s high profile and previous denial of drug use.44 
Taking influence from UK human rights legislation,45 and citing Douglas,46 Lord Hoffman 
identified that, in private information contexts, the ‘underlying value which the law 
protects’ is ‘the protection of human autonomy and dignity — the right to control the 
dissemination of information about one’s private life and the right to the esteem and 
respect of other people’.47 Like Prince Albert and Argyll’s invocation of confidence by 
aristocracy, Douglas and Campbell might give the impression that confidence is more 
useful for the rich and famous than for ordinary members of the public. They did, 
however, lead to further developments which galvanised confidence as a protection for 
the dignity of ordinary people. 
In Campbell, Nicholas LJ acknowledged that English equity protected against wrongful 
use of private information via breach of confidence but argued that in these contexts the 
action should be considered as a tort of ‘misuse of confidential information’,48 on the basis 
that the action has ‘firmly shaken off the need for an initial confidential relationship’, 
having ‘clearly changed its nature’.49 Google Inc v Vidall-Hall endorses this view, asserting 
that ‘there are now two separate causes of action: an action of breach of confidence and 
one for misuse of private information’,50 characterising the latter as a tort.51 At the least, 
English courts acknowledge the role of confidence in producing the tort that protects 
against misuse of private information, if not satisfied that confidence is conceptually or 
practically adequate for the task. Arguably, however, equity should have continuing 
influence on the development of privacy protection; even if tort is the preferred basis of 
English privacy protection, there is no need to sever the tort from its equitable roots.52 
42 Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2006] QB 125. 
43 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) cl 42. This had a significant impact on the development of English 
confidence and tort in relation to privacy, which although interesting, is a discussion for another time. 
46 Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2001] QB 977. 
47 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [50]–[51]. 
48 Ibid [14]. 
49 Ibid [15]. 
50 Google Inc v Vidall-Hall [2015] EWCA Civ 311, [21]. 
51 Ibid [43]. 
52 As English approaches are less stringent about fending off what might be called ‘fusion’. 
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This is not farfetched, since equity ‘emerged out of the Lord Chancellor’s power to hear 
complaints from those whom the common law had failed’,53 and since equitable 
confidence was the first cause of action in England to step in to protect personal privacy 
when tort historically did not. Privacy interests are coloured by the changing social and 
technological circumstances by which they are surrounded. As flexibility and adaptability 
are hallmarks of equity, it is perhaps well equipped in relation to privacy. Perhaps even 
beyond the scope of confidence, then, we could plausibly suggest that equity might be the 
most appropriate source of law to protect privacy interests, given its more evolutionary 
nature as compared with the common law and its ability to expand organically without 
the dilatory process of legislative reform.54 
In Australia, confidence remains the primary private law privacy protection. As Gleeson 
CJ stated in Lenah, dignity is also the underpinning value of personal privacy as protected 
by confidence in Australia.55 In Doe v ABC, confidence was applied where the ABC 
broadcasted the identity of a woman who was raped by her estranged husband, noting 
that victims of sexual assault often experience feelings of ‘humiliation, shame and guilt’ 
which can be compounded when inflicted by a former partner.56 The ‘highly offensive’ 
test is useful, but not determinative.57 The essence of what is protected against is not the 
offensiveness of the information itself, but the offensiveness of the behaviour of 
publishing information, which would ‘rob the person to whom the information relates of 
their right to keep their personal or confidential information private’.58 Importantly, 
Hampel J rejected the view that equitable damages cannot include ‘distress type 
damages’.59 She identified the type of loss claimed as ‘damages for personal injury, the 
affront to the plaintiff’s feelings, and the effect on her personally of the breach of 
53 Hedlund (n 34) 123.  
54 Law reform commissions have been commendably productive in generating reports concerning the 
creation of a statutory cause of action for serious invasions of privacy since 2008. However, no legislation 
has materialised so far pursuant to these reports: New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Remedies 
for the Serious Invasion of Privacy in New South Wales (Report No 57, 3 March 2016); Australian Law 
Reform Commission, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era (Report No 123, 3 September 2014); 
Victorian Law Reform Commission, Surveillance in Public Places (Report No 18, May 2010); Australian 
Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice (Report No 108, 12 
August 2008). 
55 Lenah (n 1) 226. 
56 Doe v ABC [2007] VCC 281, 36, 39, 49. 
57 See Part II above. ‘The requirement that disclosure or observation of information or conduct would be 
highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities is in many circumstances a useful 
practical test of what is private’: Lenah (n 1) 226 (Gleeson CJ). 
58 Doe (n 56) 38, [115]. 
59 Ibid 48 [143]. 
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confidence’, as distinct from ‘loss of a commercially exploitable idea or process … or a 
commercially exploitable reputation or image, as was the case in Campbell and Douglas’.60 
The most appropriate compensatory method was to award monetary damages for pain 
and suffering caused by the actionable breach, and loss occasioned by it.61 Although 
presiding in a lower court, Hampel J was willing to utilise the space left open by Lenah 
and hold that the facts in Doe also gave rise to damages in tort.62 She acknowledged that 
this development is ‘intertwined with the development of the cause of action for breach 
of confidence’ and that the value of privacy ‘springs from the importance of the law 
recognising and protecting human dignity’.63 
Doe illustrates how things of emotional impact can concern equity’s conscience which 
fastens upon parties who are careless of the impact of divulging another’s sensitive 
personal information. As technology has enabled media to reach a broad audience 
through electronic communication including televised reports, the need for a private law 
action — namely, confidence — to protect the dignitary interests of autonomy to 
determine to whom they impart sensitive personal facts is vividly apparent. This section 
has outlined how, over time, confidence has protected private information and developed 
a distinctly dignitary aspect to its protective scope. The next section, in the context of the 
internet and social media, reaffirms how breach of confidence protects dignity alongside 
changing social and technological surroundings.  
IV CONFIDENCE & DIGNITY IN INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS:
INTERNET, SOCIAL MEDIA, & REVENGE PORN 
What is referred to by the term “revenge porn” exemplifies how technological change 
enables new means of inflicting emotional abuse in the context of relationships between 
individuals. It is often: 
 characterised as an act in which one ex-partner exerts revenge on another by maliciously, 
and without consent, distributing sexually-explicit photos online, most commonly by 
60 Ibid 48 [145]. 
61 Ibid 48 [145]. 
62 Ibid 61 [157]. 
63 Ibid 49 [148]. 
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either uploading onto a “revenge porn” website or simply distributing by email or smart-
phone.64  
Undoubtedly, non-consensual distribution is nonetheless reprehensible and actionable 
without malice.65 ‘Image-based sexual abuse’ is a more broadly encompassing term to 
refer to ‘non-consensual creation and or distribution of private sexual images’.66 It is 
important to recognise that “revenge porn”, although a media-friendly and attention-
grabbing term, is just one type of many image-based sexual abuses and not a catch-all 
phrase.67 Bambauer remarks that ‘[t]he cost of distributing analog photos was an 
effective barrier to most non-consensual sharing [of explicit images]; it was simply too 
much work … But, as sexting proves, the smartphone has made intimate media 
ubiquitous’.68 The internet presence of “revenge porn” is far-reaching, with over 3,000 
websites being estimated to have existed in 2015.69 An Australian Parliamentary 
committee has undertaken an expansive discussion of the issue in terms of its prevalence, 
its impact, as well as existing and suggested avenues for legal responses.70 The magnitude 
of image-based sexual abuse and ‘revenge porn’ as a social issue in turn makes it a 
pressing legal issue.71 
A good Australian litigation lawyer, when approached by a client who had been subjected 
to the dignitary insult of their former intimate partner having uploaded private sexual 
images online, would have breach of confidence in mind (aside from advising them that 
the matter should be reported to the police).72 Giller v Procopets is appellate authority for 
64 Ian Ward, ‘A Revenger’s Tragedy’ (2017) 11 Pólemos 437, 441. 
65 Ibid 441. 
66 Clare McGlynn and Erika Rackley, ‘Image-Based Sexual Abuse’ (2017) 37 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
1, 1. 
67 See, eg, McGlynn and Rackley (n 69) 2; See also Clare McGlynn, Erika Rackley and Ruth Houghton, 
‘Beyond “Revenge Porn”: The Continuum of Image-Based Sexual Abuse’ (2017) 25 Feminist Legal Studies 
25. 
68 Derek Bambauer, ‘Exposed’ (2012) 98 Minnesota Law Review 2025, 2029. 
69 McGlynn, Rackley and Houghton (n 57). 
70 Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Phenomenon 
Colloquially Referred to as ‘Revenge Porn’ (Report, February 2016). 
71 Melanie Ehrenkranz, ‘Facebook Revenge Porn Case Shows How Police Let a Predator Get Away’ 
Gizmodo (online, 14 January 2018) <http://gizmodo.com/facebook-revenge-porn-case-shows-how-
police-let-a-perpe-1822024163>; Jenny Kleeman, ‘YouTube Star Wins Damages in Landmark UK 
‘Revenge Porn’ Case’, The Guardian (online, 17 January 2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/ 
technology/2018/jan/17/youtube-star-chrissy-chambers-wins-damages-in-landmark-uk-revenge-porn-
case>. 
72 Some jurisdictions have already enacted criminal provisions to specifically respond to ‘revenge porn’: 
See, eg, Crimes Amendment (Intimate Images) Act 2017 (NSW). Governments of others have indicated an 
intention to do so: Felicity Caldwell, ‘Revenge Porn to Become a Criminal Offence under Labor’, Brisbane 
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applying confidence to “revenge porn” and consequently awarding equitable 
compensation for emotional distress, arising from a factual situation that occurred in 
1996 where videotape was the means through which explicit footage was recorded.73  
A significant aspect of Giller in relation to equity’s ability to protect dignitary interests is 
the court’s discussion of the applicability of equitable compensation as a remedy. 
Equitable compensation was the only way in which the majority considered that justice 
could be done on the facts following the High Court’s prescribed approach of adapting 
recognised actions — rather than creating new ones such as a privacy tort — to meet new 
situations and circumstances .74 Only Maxwell P upheld Giller’s separate tort claim for 
‘intentional infliction of emotional distress’.75 There are three findings integral to the 
applicability of confidence and the corollary capacity to award equitable compensation 
in a case where the publication of private information constituted distress damage rather 
than damage to an economic interest. First, the Court of Appeal overturned the trial 
judge’s finding that — because Giller did not (and could not, as the damage had been 
done) seek an injunction — she could not recover damages under Victoria’s version of 
the Lord Cairns Act,76 a version of the legislation that conferred on the Chancery court a 
discretionary ability to grant damages (equitable compensation) in addition to or instead 
of specific performance or an injunction.77 Neave JA said of the provision (s 38) that it 
gives the court jurisdiction to award ‘damages’ ‘if the cause of action is such as to give the 
court jurisdiction to grant an injunction’ even if the injunction would have been refused 
on the discretionary factors, and that nothing in the section suggests ‘that the power was 
intended to be exercisable only where an application for injunction had actually been 
made.78  
Second, the Court rejected the view of the trial judge. Victoria’s appeal court in Giller held 
that “mere distress”, short of a demonstrated psychiatric injury, could form the basis for 
Times (online, 22 November 2017) <https://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/queensland-election-
2017/revenge-porn-to-become-a-criminal-offence-under-labor-20171122-p4yx5i.html>. 
73 Giller v Procopets (2008) 24 VLR 102: The events complained of occurred in 1996, significantly before 
2008 by which time videotapes had been rendered technologically redundant. 
74 Ibid 255 (Gleeson CJ). 
75 Ibid 114 [478] (Neave JA), as distinct from a conceivable privacy tort. 
76 Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 38. 
77 Giller (n 73) [137] (Ashley JA), [406]–[407] (Neave JA). 
78 Ibid 96 [406]–[407]. 
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awarding damages in breach of confidence.79 Neave JA explained that equitable principles 
provide a basis for ordering equitable compensation for ‘distress or embarrassment’ as a 
consequence of a breach of confidence. He noted the availability of equitable remedies, 
especially injunctions, to restrain the publication of material because of its private nature 
without having to demonstrate the potential consequence of psychiatric injury or 
financial loss.80 It would be inconsistent, then, to impose a barrier to equitable 
compensation for the harm the plaintiff has suffered once the breach has occurred.81  To 
refuse equitable relief by way of granting compensation where no other remedy was 
available ‘would illustrate that something was wrong with the law’,82 as ‘[a]n inability to 
order equitable compensation to a claimant who has suffered distress would mean that a 
claimant whose confidence was breached before an injunction could be obtained would 
have no effective remedy’.83 The Victorian Lord Cairns Act would also be satisfactory to 
provide a basis for damages,84  which ‘can be awarded in some circumstances where 
common law damages are not recoverable’, and is not limited to protecting property 
interests.85  
Third, aggravated damages were considered appropriate since the breach was deliberate 
and had the effect of humiliating, embarrassing, and distressing the plaintiff.86 The 
affirmation of the applicability of equitable compensation as a remedy for breach of 
confidence in a “revenge porn” abuse in Giller illustrates and provides an optimistic 
authority for the application of equity to protect a person’s dignity where the common 
law would leave the injustice without remedy. This is not surprising given equity’s, and 
thus confidence’s, basis in conscience (as reminded in Lenah) and its nature of flexibility 
and adaptability to novel circumstances.  
More recently, Wilson v Ferguson revisited — and affirmed — the application of 
confidence to “revenge porn”.87 During the course of a romantic relationship, the couple, 
who were also colleagues, exchanged sexual photographs and videos on the 
79 Ibid 1 [1] (Maxwell P), 31 [143], 32 [148], 34 [159], 34 [160] (Ashley JA), 96 [408] (Neave JA). 
80 Ibid 100 [423]. 
81 Ibid 100 [423]. 
82 Ibid, quoting Cornelius v De Taranto [2001] EMLR 12 [66]–[77], [69]. 
83 Ibid 100 [424]. 
84 Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 38. 
85 Giller (n 73) 101 [428]. 
86 Ibid [1], 34, [159], 34 [160], 105 [442], 106 [446]. 
87 Wilson v Ferguson [2015] WASC 15. 
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understanding that these were to be kept private. In retaliation for the plaintiff 
terminating the relationship, the defendant sought revenge by publishing 16 explicit 
photographs and two explicit videos of the plaintiff on his Facebook page.88 Mitchell J of 
Western Australia’s Supreme Court held that the appropriate relief was an injunction to 
prohibit further publication of the images, which had been removed by this point and 
equitable compensation ‘to compensate … as far as money can, for the humiliation, 
anxiety and distress which has resulted [from the breach]’.89  
This type of abuse is obviously of a dignitary nature. The defendant’s actions were clearly 
driven by a desire to cause ‘extreme embarrassment and distress’, or in his own words, 
to see the plaintiff ‘fold as a human being’.90 She was ‘absolutely horrified, disgusted, 
embarrassed, and upset’ by the publication, and particularly ‘humiliated, distressed, and 
anxious because her and the defendant worked at the same site’ and many of their friends 
and colleagues would view the images.91 Mitchell J had no difficulty in applying the 
elements of confidence.92 Importantly, he applied Giller in relation to awarding equitable 
compensation for ‘noneconomic loss comprising the embarrassment or distress 
occasioned by the disclosure of private information in breach of confidence’.93 He found 
that the applicable version of the Lord Cairns Act does not prevent this and that Giller 
‘represents a development in the equitable doctrine in Australia’.94 
Reflecting on post-Giller technological advancement, Mitchell J observed that in 1996 ‘it 
would have been difficult to predict the current pervasiveness in Australian society of the 
internet, social media platforms utilising the internet and the portable devices which 
interface the internet and those platforms’.95 The fact that these changes have so 
‘dramatically increased the ease and speed with which communications and images may 
be disseminated to the world’ often means that ‘there will be no opportunity for 
88 Ibid [17]–[42]. 
89 Ibid [1]–[2]. 
90 Ibid [33]. 
91 Ibid [33]. 
92 Ibid [55]–[59]. 
93 Ibid [71]. 
94 Ibid [74], [76]; citing Doe v ABC [2007] VCC 281 and Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game 
Meats (2002) 208 CLR 119. 
95 Ibid [79]. 
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injunctive relief to be obtained between the time the defendant forms the intention to 
distribute the images of the plaintiff and the time when he or she achieves that purpose’.96 
He reflected that: 
[N]ot uncommonly for a young couple in a sexual relationship, [the plaintiff and
defendant] shared intimate images with each other using their mobile phones during 
their relationship. This practice has introduced a relatively new verb — sexting — to the 
English language.97  
These contemporary conditions, and the ‘damaging distress and embarrassment’ caused 
by broader dissemination of such communications, ‘should inform the way in which 
equity responds to a breach of the obligation of confidence’.98 Equitable compensation 
was thus appropriate as:  
the relief which is given in response to a breach of that obligation should, however, 
accommodate contemporary circumstances and technological advances, and take 
account of the immediacy with which any person can broadcast images and text to a 
broad, yet potentially targeted, audience.99 
 Giller’s approach of awarding compensation not only ‘avoids the obligation being 
effectively unenforceable in many cases’ but also ‘may be seen as giving effect to the 
“cardinal principle of equity that the remedy must be fashioned to fit the nature of the case 
and the particular facts”’.100 The development of confidence in these types of dignitary 
cases is an ‘incremental adaptation of an established equitable principle’.101 On that note, 
it might be worth considering whether punitive damages might be applicable in similar 
cases.102 
The relationship between equity and other areas of law is relevant. Confidence has the 
advantage, as held in Wilson, that it is unnecessary to prove that the plaintiff suffered any 
96 Ibid [80]. 
97 Ibid [79]. 
98 Ibid [81]. 
99 Ibid [81]. 
100 Ibid [82], quoting Warman International Ltd v Dwyer (1995) 182 CLR 544, 559 (emphasis added). 
101 Ibid [82]. 
102 However, Harris v Digital Pulse (2003) 56 NSWLR 298 presents hurdles for recognition of exemplary 
damages in equity; Cf Canson Enterprises Ltd v Boughton & Co [1991] 3 SCR 534 for the Canadian position. 
See also David Morgan, ‘Harris v Digital Pulse: The Availability of Exemplary Damages in Equity’ (2003) 
29 Melbourne University Law Review 377. 
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psychiatric injury, as the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s reaction to what happened to 
her ‘are matters within ordinary human experience’.103 It would be unjust to require a 
plaintiff to prove actual damage such as a psychiatric illness as is required to establish 
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.104 Evolution or legislation of a 
privacy tort need not be mutually exclusive, or diminutive, of the continued significance 
of breach of confidence. It might make conceptual sense to have two separate causes of 
actions, which operate side-by-side when appropriate: invasion of privacy, a tort, for the 
obtainment of information if wrongful; and breach of confidence as the traditional 
equitable response to the publication of the information regardless of how the 
information was obtained. The English approach of a tort evolving from equity is a 
possibility but could offend those who warn sternly against ‘fusion fallacy’ — that is, the 
alteration of common law or equity principles by reference to the principles of the 
other.105 Alternatively, as suggested earlier,106 an expansion of equity further into the 
realm of privacy might be most appropriate given the dynamic nature of privacy 
interests.  This seems sensible in light of the common law’s relative rigidity and legislative 
hesitancy. It has been suggested that, to capture the general law protections, a statutory 
cause of action might supplant, thereby abolishing, equitable and common law 
developments.107 This, however, would uproot the organic ability of equity to grow as a 
privacy protection, in favour of planting legislative protections — which, given the rate 
at which Parliament tends to respond to privacy interests — might not grow in response 
to future social and technological changes and observations. 
Without expectation of confidence, interpersonal relationships of all kinds — familial, 
friendships, romantic, sexual — would be stifled or severely hindered because of the 
nature of matters that are discussed and shared in these types of relationships. Jeffrey 
Rosen considers this type of privacy as: 
103 Wilson (n 87) [102]. 
104 See Wilkinson v Downton (1897) 2 QB 57; Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Naidu (2007) 71 NSWLR 
417; Wainwright v Home Office [2004] 2 AC 406; Giller (n 73). 
105 It is thought that perpetrators of this fallacy would conclude that the Judicature Acts were ‘not devised 
to administer law and equity concurrently but to ‘fuse’ them into a new body of principles comprising 
neither of law nor of equity but of some new jurisprudence conceived by accident, born by misadventure 
and nourished by sour but high-minded wet nurses’: R P Meagher, J D Heydon and M J Leeming, Meagher, 
Gummow and Lehane’s Equity: Doctrines and Remedies (Butterworths, 4th ed, 2002) 57. 
106 See page 9 of this article.  
107 Australian Law Reform Commission, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era (Report No 123, 3 
September 2014) 72.  
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 indispensable to freedom … necessary for the formation of intimate relationships, 
allowing us to reveal parts of ourselves to friends, family members, and lovers that we 
withhold from the rest of the world. It is, therefore, imperative as a precondition for 
friendship, individuality, and even love.108  
People trust their intimate partners with a lot of things, including their dignity. Fittingly, 
breach of confidence is demonstrably capable of playing a role in protecting dignity in 
interpersonal relationships.109 
V FILLING IN THE GAPS: CONFIDENCE & DATA 
Given the enormity of recent “data breach” events that have attracted media attention, 
breach of confidence might have potential as a powerful private law protection in 
situations where a social media company, or other private or government entity, abuses 
(or loses) their control over data entrusted to it by its users, clients, customers, or 
subjects. The utility of confidence when these entities disseminate information 
unconscionably is especially worth considering since equitable compensation is not 
fettered by common law notions of foreseeability and remoteness.110 Hobbes 
characterised the state as a ‘Leviathan’, wielding ultimate powers, derived from and 
comprised by the surrendered powers of its subjects.111 Today though, the state is not the 
only entity with Leviathan-like powers, nor the only entity that could be theorised 
similarly. 
Could social media companies, and companies with the power to harvest and analyse 
multitudes of data, be conceived as holding state-like powers over their (data) subjects, 
which was (often unwittingly) generated by the user signing up to and conducting parts 
of their lives on these companies’ platforms? The relationships between these parties are 
of further concern. As Cambridge Analytica demonstrates, it is far from unimaginable that 
a social media entity would — whether by design or mismanagement — allow a third 
party access to a data subject’s private information. It is also not unimaginable that this 
data could be used politically, in the process of a political campaign, to harvest millions 
108 Jeffrey Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze: The Destruction of Privacy in America (Vintage Books, 2000) 11, 
quoted in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats (2002) 208 CLR 119, 324. 
109 See, eg, Kwok v Thang [1999] NSWSC 1034. 
110 See, eg, Teck H Ong, ‘Equitable Damages: A Powerful but Often Forgotten Remedy’ (1999) 4 Deakin 
Law Review 61, 63; Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Smith (1991) ALR 453. 
111 See, eg, Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan (Cambridge University Press, first published 1651, 1909 ed). 
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of psychological profiles of data subjects. Were this to happen, it is, again, not 
unimaginable that a government could gain access to this information in a seismic power 
grab of control over its citizens. 
Stephen Kennedy’s analysis proffers three categories of social factors that generate 
disrespect for the dignity of data subjects. First, “objectification” is the ‘ensemble of social 
factors that cause more and more distance between people so that we more readily 
regard one another as mere objects, statistics rather than real people’.112 It follows that 
those who hold our data are more likely to abuse it because they will never have to justify 
this to us, face to face.113 Second, “commodification” is the ‘ensemble of social factors that 
further alienates us into viewing one another as mere bundles of economic desires’. 
Privacy is thus undermined by values of contemporary marketing, where information 
that actually ‘give(s) shape and substance to who we are’ is conceived as neutral and 
depersonalised.114 Third, “politicisation” is the ‘ensemble of social factors that increases 
alienation by training us to regard one another as mere bundles of political 
preferences’.115 Rather than participants in rational engagement with political issues, we 
are treated as ‘mere objects for mass manipulation’.116 The activities of Cambridge 
Analytica exemplify all three of these factors and indicate the sweeping significance of 
data breaches as a social and legal issue. 
Cambridge Analytica is a company — a ‘data analytics’ firm — that worked on Donald 
Trump’s presidential campaign.117 In 2018, revelations emerged that Cambridge 
Analytica gained unauthorised access to tens of millions of Facebook accounts.118 This 
information was used to build psychological profiles of voters so they could be more 
specifically targeted, or manipulated.119 That decision-making figures in a company 
112 Kennedy (n 21) 20. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid 20–21. 
115 Ibid 21. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Carol Cadwalladr and Emma Graham Harrison, ‘Revealed: 50 Million Facebook Profiles Harvested for 
Cambridge Analytica in Major Data Breach’, The Guardian (online, 18 March 2018) <https://www.the 
guardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analytica-facebook-influence-us-election>. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Carol Cadwalladr, ‘“I Made Steve Bannon’s Psychological Warfare Tool”: Meet the Data War 
Whistleblower’, The Guardian (online, 18 March 2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/news/ 
2018/mar/17/data-war-whistleblower-christopher-wylie-faceook-nix-bannon-trump>; Paul Lewis, 
‘Trump Adviser John Bolton Worked with Cambridge Analytica on Youtube Voter Experiment’, The 
Guardian (online, 24 March 2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/mar/23/john-bolton-
cambridge-analytica-videos-donald-trump>. 
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would undertake such an activity, disregarding the sensitivity of the information they 
sought to use, demonstrates an ‘objectification’ where the basic respect owed to another 
person is ignored, a ‘commodification’ where this is ultimately done as a matter of 
“business as usual”, and ‘politicisation’ where those who seek powerful offices are on the 
purchasing end of this type of data analysis. These categories, in this context, not only 
spur consideration of the wrongfulness of, motivations for, and the products of, violating 
a data subject’s privacy, but they are also especially relevant to the autonomy of an 
individual, conceivably the root of human dignity,120 in the sense that a thorough data 
profile can be created to enable third parties to consolidate data profiles for the purpose 
of surreptitiously subverting an individual’s decision making as a dignified participant in 
a democracy. Alarmingly, Cambridge Analytica’s parent company holds contracts with 
the United States State Department, with its key former employee reporting that:121 ‘The 
company has created psychological profiles of 230 million Americans. And now they want 
to work with the Pentagon? It’s like Nixon on steroids.’122 Cambridge Analytica 
exemplifies all three threats to personal data par excellence (objectification¸ 
commercialisation, and politicisation) and demonstrates the increasing exigency for the 
private law to protect the dignitary concerns of data subjects that are held legitimately, 
or, in this case, illegitimately.  
Cambridge Analytica spawns several legal issues concerning data protection and the need 
for members of the public to have some form of private law recourse, not least the breach 
of confidence that occurs if such information is imparted or misused by “data analytics” 
firms. The relevance of confidence in terms of how this information is used is strikingly 
obvious in light of the ability of private companies, through highly advanced technology, 
to subjugate human dignitary interests on such a broad and deep scale for commercial 
and political gains. The Office of the Australian Information Commissioner has released a 
statement that the Office ‘is making inquiries with Facebook to ascertain whether any 
120 Kant (n 2) 43. 
121 Cadwalladr (n 119). 
122 Ibid; Australia’s acting Privacy Commissioner has reported that, following confirmation from 
Facebook, that ‘the information of over 300,000 Australian users may have been acquired and used 
without authorisation’: Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘Investigation into Facebook 
Opened’ (Media Release, 5 April 2018) <https://www.oaic.gov.au/media-and-
speeches/statements/facebook-and-cambridge-analytica>. 
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personal information of Australians was involved’.123 The Commissioner stated that he 
‘will consider Facebook’s response and whether any further regulatory action is 
required’, listing powers conferred by the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth).124 These include: 
investigating an alleged interference with privacy, exercising regulatory action powers 
or powers to accept an enforceable undertaking, making a determination, or applying to 
the court for civil penalty provisions.125 Subsequently, the Acting Commissioner has 
opened an investigation under the Act.126 As Richardson points out, though, the main 
limitation of statutory data protections is that these rely on decisions of public officials, 
rather than allowing individuals the ‘power directly to vindicate their legal rights’.127  
The general law — comprised of common law and equity — might be well equipped to 
‘produce a set of data protection norms’.128 Torts of negligence and intentional infliction 
of emotional distress may occasionally be applicable, but are not easily invoked, in 
‘information’ contexts.129 In England, a product of the evolution of confidence, the ‘misuse 
of private information’ tort, might be readily applicable.130 The Cambridge Analytica 
debacle may generate further support for legislative reform or judicial progress towards 
an Australian ‘invasion of privacy tort’, which would provide more reason for companies 
to be careful about illegitimately gaining access to data in the first place.131  
Confidence, however, should be considered as one cause of action, within a framework of 
potential privacy protections, that itself allows for private law redress whereby 
individuals can personally take action when their data is abused. It has equity’s advantage 
of the potential to look at the issue from outside the immediately apparent lenses of 
123 Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘Statement from the Australian Information and 
Privacy Commissioner on Facebook and Cambridge Analytica’ (Media Release, 20 March 2018) 
<https://www.oaic.gov.au/media-and-speeches/statements/facebook-and-cambridge-analytica>. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). 
126 Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘Investigation into Facebook Opened’ (Media 
Release, 5 April 2018) <https://www.oaic.gov.au/media-and-speeches/statements/facebook-and-
cambridge-analytica>. 
127 Megan Richardson, ‘The Battle for Rights — Getting Data Protection Cases to Court’ (2015) 2 Oslo Law 
Review 23, 24. 
128 Ibid 29. 
129 Swinney v Chief Constable of Northumbria Police Force [1997] QB 464; James Rhodes v OPO [2015] 
UKSC 32.  
130 Google Inc v Vidall-Hall [2015] EWCA Civ 311. 
131 See Tanya Alpin, ‘The Future of Breach of Confidence and the Protection of Privacy’ (2007) 7 Oxford 
University Commonwealth Law Journal 137; Megan Richardson, ‘Whither Breach of Confidence: A Right to 
Privacy for Australia’ (2002) 26 Melbourne University Law Review 381. 
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contract and formal consent and could apply to both the social media entity that initially 
held and passed on the data as well as the data analytics firm that subsequently divulged 
it. The application of its elements is of course dependent on, and open to further analysis 
in each factual situation.132 Even so, prima facie, that a data-subject would fairly think 
information to be viewable to only a selected group of people would indicate that the 
information is, first, of a confidential nature and, second, imparted in circumstances 
attaching such an obligation. That modern formulations of confidence do not even require 
a pre-existing relationship, or expression or confidentiality, between parties — especially 
given the imbalanced power relationship between data-holders vis-a-vis equity’s 
protection of the vulnerable — invites consideration that people assume that their data 
will not be used for the purpose of manipulating deeply personal information in an 
objectifying, commodifying, and politicising manner.133 Equity might even be willing to 
set aside ‘terms and condition’ agreements — which are considered perfunctory and 
rarely read or understood by users — on the basis that it would be unconscionable to 
enforce them. The third element of confidence — that publication caused detriment — 
could be satisfied by the distress or dignitary harm inflicted by abusing the data subject’s 
privacy interests. Significantly, this element does not impose the burden on the plaintiff 
of having to prove economic or psychiatric damage. Finally, and importantly, 
remembering that ‘the real task is to decide what a properly informed conscience has to 
say about publication’ indicates that the profit motive should not be looked on as a 
satisfactory excuse for using a data subject’s private information in a way that objectifies, 
commodifies, or politicises their information in the manners described by Kennedy.134 
Interestingly, in English law, surreptitious access to a person’s computer hard drive 
appears to, in itself, entail a breach of confidence, rather than any subsequent misuse of 
that information.135 As Lord Neuberger states: ‘It is of the essence of the claimant’s right 
to confidentiality that he can choose whether, and, if so, to whom and in what 
circumstances and on what terms, to reveal the information which has the protection of 
the confidence’.136 Helpfully, courts have considered information to remain confidential, 
132 See also Australian Broadcasting Commission v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd [2001] 208 CLR 199, 222 
(Gleeson CJ), quoting Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41, 47 (Megarry J). 
133 Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109, 281. 
134 See also Australian Broadcasting Commission v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd [2001] 208 CLR 199, 222 
(Gleeson CJ). 
135 Imerman v Tchenguiz [2011] 2 WLR 592. 
136 Ibid 619–620 (Lord Neuberger MR). 
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even if conveyed to a limited audience, unless it has reached the ‘public domain’, being 
‘so generally accessible that, in all the circumstances, it cannot be regarded as 
confidential’.137 Thus, limited publication to online ‘friends’ might not in itself defeat a 
plaintiff’s confidence claim when their data was non-consensually passed on by a social 
media platform. The broad protective scope of confidence may posit ‘something quite 
significant by way of a [general law] data protection right, despite the constraints on the 
doctrine’s focus on confidential, not just personal, information’.138 Further, the prospect 
of having to defend against multiple individual actions, or against ‘class actions’, might 
have more of a preventative impact on potential data abusers. 
VI CONSCIENCE AND CONFIDENCE
The confidence cases about dignitary interests cited in this paper — concerning material 
from private sketches,139 letters,140 print photographs,141 news publications,142 television 
reports,143 video footage,144 to the advent of internet technologies such as social media 
and smartphones145 — show the trajectory of technological development leading into the 
digital age and the parallel exigency for the law to maintain pace alongside these 
developments and their potential to aid in the abuse of human dignity — ‘[e]quity, after 
all, is about more than the vindication of monetary interests’.146 Equity’s basis in 
“conscience” can explain its ability to protect dignity. The courts accept that “conscience” 
is the basis for invoking the doctrine of confidence.147 Underlying this must be an implicit 
acceptance that our conscience is the “alarm” in our head that tells us, even if we were to 
contemplate abusing the confidence of a person who had imparted sensitive personal 
information, that there is a basic level of respect — dignity — that constitutes a line that 
we do not cross even in moments of fury or in pursuit of profit. Equity’s conscience is 
137 Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109, 281–282 (Lord Goff). 
138 Richardson (n 127) 32. 
139 Prince Albert v Strange [1849] Eng R 255. 
140 Gee v Pritchard (1818) 36 ER 670. 
141 Pollard v Photographic Company (1888) 40 Ch D 345. 
142 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22; Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2006] QB 125. 
143 Doe v ABC [2007] VCC 281. 
144 Giller (n 73) 
145 Wilson (n 87) 
146 Duane Rudolph, ‘Workers, Dignity, and Equitable Tolling’ (2017) 15 Northwestern Journal of Human 
Rights 126, 159. 
147 Moorgate Tobacco v Philip Morris Ltd (No 2) (1984) 156 CLR 414, 438 (Deane J); Australian 
Broadcasting Commission v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd [2001] 208 CLR 199, 227 (Gleeson CJ). 
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reflective of the human conscience, the inner court in our head that issues a mental 
injunction that tells us that the envisaged conduct is unacceptable.148 Equity is a product 
of a human need for a space in the law that uses conscience to fill in the voids in the 
common law that would otherwise allow unconscientious treatment of others. Similarly, 
equity in Aristotle’s logic is what fills the gaps in “law” where its application would deliver 
an unforeseen injustice.149 Having a private action that enables a person — in a personal 
relationship, or as a data subject in relationships with data holders — to take private 
action against the party who abuses their trust over sensitive personal information is one 
such area of law where equity had developed a concept that the law sorely needs to 
protect human dignitary interests.  
VII CONCLUSION 
As technological development has shown, this action is of increasing relevance.  It has 
potential as a social counterbalance against technological advancement. Section III traced 
the history of confidence developing as a privacy protection, which gradually became 
more clearly applicable to dignitary abuses. Section IV discussed a contemporarily 
relevant way in which confidence protects dignity, with regard to the recent phenomenon 
of “revenge porn”, a context concerning interpersonal relationships where an individual 
abuses the trust and privacy of another. Section V considered breach of confidence in 
contexts where the abuser of personal information (or data) is a corporate or government 
body, which — as the Cambridge Analytica outrage illustrates — bears drastic social 
significance. If one thing should be taken from this paper, it is that confidence presents a 
means of redressing, and potentially deterring the types and scope of dignitary abuses 
that can, now in the digital age, easily be inflicted on people by other individuals, or 
companies, or governments. 
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